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 The First Moment of
 Scientific Inquiry: C. S. Peirce
 on the Logic of Abduction
 Timothy Shanahan
 I. Introduction
 C. F. Delaney has suggested that the first or abductive phase of
 Peirce 's general characterization of scientific method can be distin-
 guished into two "moments." The first is concerned with the original
 generation of those hypotheses which will form the set of potential
 explanations for the phenomena under consideration, and is a func-
 tion of the creative imagination of some (gifted) individuals. As such
 it cannot be reduced to strict formulae or procedural rules. The second
 moment is concerned with the preferential ordering of the hypotheses
 in this set in relation to considerations bearing on the economy of re-
 search. This moment of the abductive phase is rule-governed, with
 features such as "simplicity" supplying the requisite selectory cri-
 teria.1 This distinction is a useful one for coming to understand
 more fully Peirce 's account of the abductive phase of inquiry in re-
 lation to the grounds of validity undergirding the scientific enterprise
 as he conceives it.
 While Delaney's paper deals primarily (though not exclusively)
 with the second moment, the present paper focusses especially on
 the first moment, which is used as a point of departure for a more
 wide-ranging investigation of some of the characteristic features
 of Peirce 's thought related to his philosophies of mind and nature.
 Following a brief review of Peirce 's general theory of the stages of
 scientific inquiry, we proceed to examine his view of the role and
 importance of the abductive phase within the scientific enterprise.
 He thinks that this phase rests ultimately upon a particular faculty
 or instinct man possesses which permits him a certain insight into
 the most general structural features of nature. Since the scientific
 enterprise as he conceives it rests ultimately upon this faculty, it is
 appropriate to inquire further into the grounds of its validity. We
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 shall suggest that Peirce offers at least three distinct explanatory
 accounts of this faculty. After discussing each of these accounts
 individually, we shall suggest how they can be seen as representing
 characteristic features of Peirce 's distinctive approach to human know-
 ledge. The working assumption throughout this paper will be that
 Peirce is an important philosopher whose often enigmatic remarks
 are nonetheless worth taking seriously. Such an attitude would seem
 to entail not only accurately presenting ideas from his various avail-
 able papers, but also attempting to draw together and relate some
 of these ideas to one another, to organize them in some fashion, in a
 way that he himself never did, in order to render explicit the poten-
 tial unity and coherence of his thought. Rather than treating his
 scattered remarks as haphazard and unrelated to one another, there-
 fore, they will be seen as distinct threads woven into the fabric of
 his unified philosophy.
 II. The Logic of Abduction
 SI. Peirce's General Theory of Scientific Inquiry
 While our primary concern is with Peirce's understanding of the
 logical validity of the first moment of the abductive phase of inquiry,
 it may not be amiss to begin by situating the abductive phase within
 his general theory of the stages of scientific inquiry. As noted above,
 the abductive phase could be considered the first stage of scientific
 inquiry inasmuch as it is concerned with the original generation and
 recommendation of explanatory hypotheses, i.e., with the positing
 of specific laws to account for the observed phenomena under con-
 sideration. We shall have more to say about this stage in the next
 section. Peirce terms the second stage "Deduction" in which the
 hypothesis selected is examined and its consequences are derived. Like
 the first stage, the second stage also has two parts. The first part con-
 sists in logical analysis to explicate the hypothesis and to render it as
 perfectly distinct as possible. "Explication" is followed by "Demon-
 stration", wherein the inquirer considers more closely the consider-
 ations already introduced or involved in the Explication in order to
 derive its experiential consequents. Deduction having been suffici-
 ently carried out, "the inquiry enters upon its Third Stage, that of
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 ascertaining how far those consequents accord with experience, and
 of judging whether the hypothesis is sensibly correct, or requires some
 inessential modification, or must be entirely rejected" (6.472). 2 He
 divides this third or inductive stage into three parts. In "Classification"
 general ideas are attached to objects of experience; in the "Proba-
 tions" these ideas are tested with respect to the experiential conse-
 quents; and in the "Sentential" part of the Inductive stage the in-
 quirer "appraises the different Probations singly, then their combina-
 tions, then makes self-appraisal of these very appraisals themselves,
 and passes final judgment on the whole result" (6.472). ^ This sketch
 of the three stages of inquiry, while omitting many important details,
 may nonetheless be sufficient to contextualize the abductive phase
 within Peirce 's more general theory of scientific inquiry. With this
 as background, we might now turn our attention more fully to his
 account of the First Stage.
 S2. The Abductive Phase
 One of Peirce 's central concerns in developing his distinctive phi-
 losophy of science is with the nature of the logical validity possessed
 by each of the three stages he discusses. He believes that Kant cor-
 rectly analyzed the validity of Deduction. The fact that, "This kind
 of reasoning deals exclusively with Pure Ideas attaching primarily to
 Symbols and derivatively to other Signs of our own creation," Peirce
 thinks, plus "the fact that man has a power of Explicating his own
 meaning renders Deduction valid" (6.474). "Induction," on the other
 hand, "is a kind of reasoning that may lead us into error." Yet, it
 follows a kind of method which, if sufficiently persisted in, will lead
 to Inductive Certainty. The decisive question of the "logical Critic",
 then, is "What sort of validity can be attributed to the First Stage of
 Inquiry?" Clearly, given its foremost position in the series of stages
 Peirce outlines, its justification becomes crucial. Peirce begins his
 answer by precisely identifying the peculiar importance of this stage
 in the overall project of scientific inquiry:
 Observe that neither Deduction nor Induction contributes
 the smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the in-
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 quiry. They render the indefinite definite; Deduction expli-
 cates; Induction evaluates; that is all. Over the chasm that
 yawns between the ultimate goal of science and such ideas
 of Man's environment as, coming over him during his prim-
 eval wanderings in the forest, while yet his very notion of
 error was of the vaguest, he managed to communicate to
 some fellow, we are building a cantilever bridge of induction,
 held together by scientific struts and ties. Yet every plank
 of its advance is first laid by [abduction]^ alone . . . and
 neither Deduction nor Induction contributes a single new
 concept to the structure." (6.475)
 The problem, then, is the logical validation of those hypotheses
 which constitute the initial introduction of propositional content into
 the scientific inquiry. It is clear that without the justificatory ground-
 ing of these hypotheses, the conclusions of the second and third stages
 of inquiry are also cast in doubt, and the edifice of science is set upon
 a foundation of questionable legitimacy whose conclusions are no
 better.
 The problem here is not unlike that faced by Aristotle in developing
 his own demonstrative philosophy of science. In order to stay an
 infinite regress in the order of demonstration, it was necessary to
 secure premises which were not themsleves the conclusions of logically
 prior demonstrations. Aristotle's solution to this problem was to say
 that since scientific knowledge was clearly possible, that man must
 possess a faculty of epagoge or intuitive insight into the first principles
 requisite for a scientific demonstration. Furthermore, the premises
 thus secured must be certain. Without such an assumption, scientific
 knowledge and progress would be simply inexplicable.5
 Peirce faces a somewhat similar problem in justifying the initial
 elements of scientific reasoning as he understands it. His solution to
 his own problem is not unlike Aristotle's, in the sense that he too
 insists that there must be access to some basic premises from which
 to proceed if scientific knowledge is to be attainable. Or, at the very
 least, the philosopher of science must assume that there is such access:
 "The only justification possible, ... is the justification of desperation.
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 That is to say, that if he is not to say such things, he will be quite
 unable to know anything of positive fact" (5.603). But in keeping
 with his own avowed fallibilism, Peirce readily concedes that even
 though we are forced to assume that we have access to such basic
 premises when engaged in scientific inquiry, still we are not to con-
 sider such premises as immutable or as absolutely certain. Rather,
 "we try them, we compare them with experience, we hold ourselves
 ready to throw them overboard at a moment's notice from exper-
 ience" (1.634). Indeed, he thinks that the initial hypotheses, "are
 so mixed up with error that they can never be trusted till they have
 been corrected by experiment" (1.404). Clearly for Peirce the ab-
 ductive phrase does not stand alone in the scientific project, since its
 products are always responsible to the critical elaboration and evalu-
 ation of the other two stages.
 Although he begins his discussion of the validity of abduction with
 the kind of transcendental justification sketched above, he is also
 convinced that certain quasi-historical considerations are antecedent
 and lend support to such an account: "There is a reason, an interpre-
 tation, a logic, in the course of scientific advance, and this indisput-
 ably proves to him who has perceptions of rational or significant re-
 lations, that man's mind must have been attuned to the truth of things
 in order to discover what he has discovered. It is the very bedrock of
 logical truth" (6.476). What he seems to be most struck by is not
 simply the static fact of scientific knowledge, nor even our present
 advanced state of scientific knowledge, but rather the tremendous
 progress science has made in the relatively brief period in which man
 has existed. Such progress would be simply inexplicable apart from
 the assumption of some special faculty associated with the human
 mind, since, "Nature is a far vaster and less clearly arranged reper-
 tory of facts than a census report; and if men had not come to it
 with special aptitudes for guessing right, it may well be doubted whe-
 ther in the ten or twenty thousand years that they may have existed
 their greatest mind would have attained the amount of knowledge
 which is actually possessed by the lowest idiot" (2.753).
 Besides the fact that there must be postulated this special aptitude
 for guessing right if the rapid progress of science is to be accounted
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 for, Peirce also offers a more properly historical argument in support
 of this view. In particular, he thinks that a brief perusal of the his-
 tory of science will bear him out in his belief that such an aptitude has
 in fact been crucially operative in the work of some of the most ori-
 ginal and important scientists:
 In examining the reasonings of those physicists who gave
 to modern science the initial propulsion which has insured
 its healthful life ever since, we are struck with the great,
 though not absolutely decisive, weight they allowed to
 instinctive judgments. Galileo appeals to il lume naturale
 at the most critical stages of his reasoning. Kepler, Gil-
 bert, and Harvey - not to speak of Copernicus - substan-
 tially rely upon an inward power, not sufficient to reach
 the truth by itself, but yet supplying an essential factor to
 the influences carrying their minds to the truth. (1.80;
 cf. 5.591)
 By "the truth" Peirce is referring to the natural laws, the discovery
 of which constitutes the major achievement of each of the scientists
 mentioned. If we are to account for the meteoric progress of science
 conceived as the investigation into the laws which govern natural
 phenomena, then the proposed mental faculty of "guessing right"
 must be one which associates the human mind with the natural laws
 which constitute the formally objective features of nature. That is
 to say, there must be a "fit" of some sort between the human cog-
 nizer and the nomological phenomena science is continually disclosing;
 for without such a fit the first stage (and hence both other stages) of
 scientific inquiry, could never be logically validated: "It is certain
 that the only hope of [abductive] reasoning ever reaching the truth
 is that there may be some natural tendency toward an agreement be-
 tween the ideas which suggest themselves to the human mind and
 those which are concerned in the laws of nature" (1.81; cf. 2.753;
 1.121; 2.86; 5.604; 6.531; 7.38; 7.680). Having thus emphasized
 both the need and the apparent historical reality of such an agree-
 ment, the first moment of the abductive phase has been given at least
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 a prima facie justification in terms of a proposed faculty correlating
 the human mind and the laws of nature. The next step in the logical
 validation of the first moment would be to explicate the origination
 of this ability in more detail, perhaps by providing a genetic explana-
 tion of some sort. The notion of 'instinct' provides Peirce with a
 useful general account of what he has in mind, and it is to this account
 that we now turn.
 S3. The Instinctual Basis of Abduction
 Peirce 's initial strategy is to characterize this ability as a species of
 Insight into the general or law-like elements in nature which, though
 "not strong enough to be oftener right than wrong," nonetheless is
 "strong enough not to be overwhelmingly more often wrong than
 right" (5.173). Despite the fair amount of reliability he apparently
 attributes to this insight, he stresses that, "it has certainly not been
 [acquired] by a self-controlled and critical logic." Rather, "it is to be
 referred to the same general class of operations to which Perceptive
 Judgments belong" (5.173). The "same general class to which Per-
 ceptive Judgments belong" is presumably the class of those faculties
 which operate naturally and pre-critically to provide the organism
 with important information about its immediate environment. Yet
 such insight is not identical with perceptual judgment, since it "is at
 the same time of the general nature of Instinct, resembling the in-
 stincts of the animal in its so far surpassing the general powers of
 our reason and for its directing us as if we were in possession of facts
 that are entirely beyond the reach of our senses" (5.173; emphasis
 added). Reason is able to draw connections between ideas, and our
 perceptual faculties are able to provide information about the im-
 mediate sensory environment; but instinct provides, as it were, a rule
 for acting applicable to all conditions sufficiently similar to those in
 which the organism has developed. Before proceeding to discuss how
 this instinctual ability functions in the first moment of abduction,
 i.e.. in hypothesis generation, it might be useful to pause here in order
 to explain briefly what he understands by the term 'instinct*.
 Peirce defines an 'animal instinct' as "a natural disposition, or
 inborn determination of the individual's Nature (his 'nature' being
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 that within him which causes his behaviour to be such as it is), mani-
 fested by a certain unity of quasi-purpose in his behaviour" (7.381,
 n.19). In man, however, "this behaviour is always conscious" and
 (barring extraordinary stress) is "always partially controlled by the
 deliberative exercise of imagination and reflexion. " The question
 that naturally arises here is, how is this understanding of human instinct
 to be squared with his own earlier claim that the faculty of Insight
 responsible for abduction has not been acquired by a "self-contol-
 led and critical logic"? The important distinction to take note of
 in this context is that between the primitive acquisition of this a-
 bility and one's present awareness of its operation. While the ability
 was originally acquired non-deliberately and non-reflectively, it now
 functions at least partially on the deliberative and reflective level of
 consciousness. It is neither wholly non-rational nor wholly spon-
 taneous. Rather, on the one hand, "to the man himself the instinctual
 action appears to be entirely rational." But on the other hand, "the
 adaptation of the behaviour to its quasi-purpose in some definite
 part overleaps all control" (ibid.), Peirce's understanding of human
 instinct thus has three essential features: (i) "it is conscious," (ii)
 it "is determined to a quasi-purpose," and (iii) "in definite respects
 it escapes all control" (ibid.). But if Peirce wishes to explain hypo-
 thesis generation in terms of a certain instinct as above specified, we
 should still want to know how this instinct itself is to be accounted
 for. Our next concern, therefore, is to consider how he explains
 such an instinct in the first place. Actually he offers three distinct
 explanations for this instinctual ability to non-discursively grasp the
 general nomological features of reality, each of which we will ex-
 amine in turn.
 S4. The Argument from Adaptive Value
 In the first place, Peirce thinks that this particular instinct, like
 every other instinct possessed by animals, can be explained in virtue
 of a certain adaptive value associated with it: "It seems incontest-
 able, therefore, that the mind of man is strongly adapted to the com-
 prehension of the world; at least, so far as this goes, that certain con-
 ceptions, highly important for such a comprehension, naturally arise
 Peirce on the Logic of Abduction 457
 in his mind; and, without such a tendency, the mind could never
 have had any development at all" (6.417). The idea here seems to
 be that if not the comprehension of the world embodied in actual
 propositions expressing laws of nature, then at least certain "con-
 ceptions" highly important for such a comprehension, arise naturally
 in human consciousness. And such conceptions are here held to be
 necessary prerequisites for arriving at any further conceptions or com-
 plexes of conceptions, i.e., propositons. The emphasis here is on
 the general conceptions which constitute the primary adaptive ori-
 entation of the human mind to the world.
 Not surprisingly, perhaps, the "Kantist" Peirce mentions specifically
 such general conceptions as time, space, and force. He then pro-
 ceeds to suggest an explanation for the possession of such conceptions
 in terms of their adaptive value: "The great utility and indispensable-
 ness of the conceptions of time, space, and force, even to the lowest
 intelligence, are such as to suggest that they are the results of natural
 selection. Without something like geometrical, kinetical, and mecha-
 nical conceptions, no animal could seize his food or do anything which
 might be necessarry for the preservation of the species" (6.418).
 True, an animal might be endowed with an instinct which served es-
 sentially the same purpose, that is, which functioned fairly well given
 the animal's characteristic habitat, though it made no use of the con-
 ceptions of time, space, and force. "But, as that animal would have
 an immense advantage in the struggle for life whose mechanical con-
 ceptions did not break down in a novel situation (such as development
 must bring about), there would be a constant selection in favor of
 more and more correct ideas of these matters" (6.418; cf. 4.91, 1.118,
 5.45,5.586,5.591).
 It is important to note here that Peirce is framing his explanation
 simply in terms of the mechanics of natural selection. The very gen-
 eral conceptions that he wants to attribute adaptive value to are geared
 toward helping an animal perform efficiently such behaviors as are
 necessary to maintain it and its species in existence. He is even
 willing to admit that such conceptions are not strictly speaking neces-
 sary to an animal's survival, so long as the animal has some alternative
 conceptions which allow it to manage fairly well in its own particular
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 niche. But those animals with a more precise set of mechanical con-
 ceptions will have a decided advantage in the struggle for survival
 over those lacking such conceptions or instincts.
 Of course, Peirce's primary interest is with the functioning of these
 instinctual conceptions in man. If greater precision (i.e., nearness
 to the "correct ideas of these matters") brings with it greater adaptive/
 survival value, then it would seem that there would be a kind of "push"
 towards the evolution of certain animals possessing a higher degree
 of precision in such conceptions, eventually reaching up from very
 general conceptions to a comprehension of fundamental relation-
 ships between these conceptions. Enter Scientific Man: "Thus would
 be attained the knowledge of that fundamental law upon which all
 science rolls; namely, that forces depend upon relations of time, space,
 and mass. When this idea was once sufficiently clear, it would require
 no more than a comprehensible degree of genius to discover the exact
 nature of these relations" (6.418). It would seem on this account
 that Newton's discovery of the inverse square law, for instance, was
 really, if viewed in the proper perspective, simply a high point in
 an evolutionary process which began at least with the beginning of
 the human race and, most likely, with the beginning of the universe.
 The precision of the concepts and the apprehension of their inter-
 relation were attained through eons of the evolutionary development
 of (cosmic?) consciousness. Newton's "comprehensible degree of
 genius" was simply "to discover the exact nature of these relations."
 But if this is to be our explanation of the discovery of natural laws,
 namely, in terms of the adaptive value of the possession of such an
 adaptation, we are naturally led to inquire into the degree of adap-
 tive value contributed by such an adaptation. Why should we think
 that a knowledge of the laws of classical mechanics, for instance,
 rather than simply an apprehension of the basic conceptions of time,
 space, and mass and their (rough) interrelations, should contribute
 anything at all to an organism's survival fitness? It seems rather
 that such knowledge might actually prove a hindrance in a world
 in which life depends upon instantaneous behavioral responses to
 simple and immediate spatio-temporal stimuli. Peirce himself seems
 to have been sensitive to such a difficulty: "Such a hypothesis na-
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 turally suggests itself, but it must be admitted that it does not seem
 sufficient to account for the extraordinary accuracy with which these
 conceptions apply to the phenomena of Nature, and it is probable
 that there is some secret here which remains to be discovered" (6.418).
 It is possible that he is covertly referring to his own doctrine of "sy-
 nechism," which is at the basis of another of his explanations for the
 validity of the abductive phase.
 S5. The Argument from Synechism
 The above account, while clearly grounded in some strong Kantian
 roots, may suggest, when more fully elaborated, some strikingly He-
 gelian consequences. One almost gets the sense that for Peirce the
 universe has evolved to a point at which part of the universe is finally
 able to reflect upon itself: the universe has finally reached the stage
 of Self-Consciousness. This intimacy between the laws of nature
 and man's mind is developed further in his next explanation. It is not
 surprising, he thinks, that the mind should have this faculty of hitting
 upon the correct laws of nature, since the mind itself was formed by
 these very laws of nature: "Certain uniformities, that is to say, certain
 general ideas of action, prevail throughout the universe, and the reason-
 ing mind is itself a product of this universe. These same laws are
 thus, by logical necessity, incorporated into [its] own being" (5.603).
 Because man's mind has developed under the influence of the laws of
 nature, its tendencies are naturally in accord with those laws: "It is
 somehow more than a mere figure of speech to say that nature fe-
 cundates the mind of man with ideas which, when those ideas grow
 up, will resemble their father, Nature." (5.591, 7.39, 7.508, 7.46).
 "There can," Peirce states, "be no reasonable doubt that man's mind,
 having been developed under the influence of the laws of nature, for
 that reason naturally thinks somewhat after nature's pattern" (7.39).
 The idea here expressed, it must be admitted, does not strike the
 present writer with the kind of luminous self-evidence with which it
 apparently struck Peirce. Fortunately, he provides an example which
 is intended to make his meaning "tolerably clear." The particular
 family of lines called 'straight', he says, has no geometrical properties
 distinguishing it from any of the other innumerable families of lines
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 of which there is one and only one through any two points. Now
 it is a law of dynamics that every dynamical relation between two
 points is similar (except in quantity) to every such dynamical rela-
 tion between any other two points on the same straight line. Con-
 sequently a straight line is the shortest distance between two points,
 and because of this light appears to move along such lines. This being
 the case, we recognize them visually and call them 'straight*. "Thus,
 the faculty of sight naturally causes us to assign great prominence to
 such lines; and thus when we come to form a hypothesis about the
 motion of a particle left uninfluenced by any other, it becomes
 natural for us to suppose that it moves in a straight line" (5.603).
 Here we have an example of how our perceptual apparatus plays a
 significant role in the kind of conceptual principle that will naturally
 suggest itself to the inquiring mind. And this, in turn, is simply a
 particular instantiation of a more general law operative in the forma-
 tion of our minds: "The reason this turns out to be true is, there-
 fore, that this first law of motion is a corollary from a more general
 law which, governing all dynamics, governs light, and causes the idea
 of straightness to be a predominant one in our minds" (5.603). Peirce
 sums up his view by saying:
 In this way, general considerations concerning the universe,
 strictly philosophical considerations, all but demonstrate
 that if the universe conforms, with any approach to ac-
 curacy, to certain highly pervasive laws, and if man's mind
 has been developed under the influence of those laws, it is
 to be expected that he should have a natural light, or light
 of nature, or instinctive insight, or genius, tending to make
 him guess those laws aright, or nearly aright. This con-
 clusion is confirmed when we find that every species of
 animal is endowed with a similar genius. . . . (5.604)
 Here again we have the idea that man's ability to "guess aright" the
 laws of nature is to be placed on a continuum with the instincts all
 animals are endowed with, albeit of a very high order. But he here
 links this idea with another which seems to be logically distinct from
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 it: that a partial explanation of man's ability to guess aright the laws
 of nature is a function of the fact that man's mind, no less than every
 other entity existing in nature, has itself been formed by these very
 laws. But if nature is essentially material, and the human mind is an
 immaterial substance, then how is it that the former can play such
 a significant role in the development of the latter? The answer must
 be framed in terms of Peirce 's distinctive philosophies of mind and
 nature, according to which natural laws are conceived as "habits"
 which have become ingrained in the universe, a view which seems
 strange at first until it is realized that Peirce views matter and and mind
 as simply two poles on a single continuum, with all "material" things
 exhibiting some degree of mental activity. "[W]e ought to suppose
 a continuity between the characters of mind and matter, so that matter
 would be nothing but mind that had such indurated habits as to cause
 it to act with a peculiarly high degree of mechanical regularity or
 routine" (6.277). This is, in turn, simply a direct consequence of
 his doctrine of synechism, according to which, "all that exists is con-
 tinuous" (1.172). Given such a doctrine, then "the reaction between
 mind and matter would be of no essentially different kind from the
 action between parts of the mind that are in continuous union. . ."
 (6.277). In this sense it can be said that, "habit is by no means ex-
 clusively a mental fact. Empirically, we find that some plants take
 habits. The stream of water that wears a bed for itself is forming a
 habit" (5.492). Transposing this account into the human realm, it
 is as if the highly pervasive general laws of nature, which are themselves
 merely "habits" governing effete matter/mind, have left structural
 traces or grooves in human consciousness and thought thus naturally
 follows the lines laid down in its very fabric: "Thus it is that, our
 minds having been formed under the influence of phenomena governed
 by the laws of mechanics, certain conceptions entering into those
 laws become implanted in our minds, so that we readily guess at what
 the laws are" (6.10; cf. 1.118, 5.47, 5.586, 5.591, 5.603). In fact,
 Peirce thinks that without such a natural prompting our ability to
 discover laws of nature with the precision that we do would be in-
 explicable.
 But actually it is not quite as simple as this; for obviously many of
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 the laws of nature physicists discover, besides boasting of a fair degree
 of precision, are also highly complex. Think, for example, of the
 laws associated with subatomic particles, relativity theory, and so
 forth. Peirce admits that, "The further physical studies depart from
 phenomena which have directly influenced the growth of the mind,
 the less we can expect to find the laws which govern the mind "sim-
 ple," that is, composed of a few conceptions natural to our minds"
 (6.10). And again, "as we penetrate further and further from the
 surface of nature, instinct ceases to give any decided answers; and
 if it did, there would no longer be any reason to suppose its answers
 approximated to the truth" (6.508, 7.606). How then does he pro-
 pose to explain the generation of hypotheses associated with the
 often highly non-intuitive natural laws that physicists are continu-
 ally revealing? The answer is perhaps found in an initially unexpected
 place.
 S6. Laws of Nature and God's Thought
 To cover these cases of more complex hypothesis generation it may
 be that Peirce has one final explanation at his disposal, allied to the
 previous explanation but also significantly different. He gives a brief
 hint of it in the following passage:
 [E]very scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon
 is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which
 the human reason is analogous; and that it really is so
 all the successes of science in its applications to human con-
 venience are witnesses. They proclaim that truth over the
 length and breadth of the modern world. In the light of the
 successes of science to my mind there is a degree of base-
 ness in denying our birthright as children of God and in
 shamefacedly slinking away from such anthropomorphic
 conceptions of the universe. (1.316)
 As in the previous explanations he is claiming a sort of intimacy be-
 tween the objective structural features of nature (natural laws and
 their conceptual constituents) and the most general cognitive features
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 of the human mind (conceptions of space, time, etc. and various re-
 lationships thereof), with the latter being explained in terms of the
 former. Here he introduces the notion of man's kinship with God
 but does not go on to develop how an "anthropomorphic conception
 of the universe" constitutes a hypothesis concerning scientific ex-
 planations of natural phenomena, beyond suggesting that each such
 explanation implies that there is something in nature to which human
 reason is "analogous." This could be taken as making the same point
 as in the previous explanation. In another passage, however, Peirce
 goes farther and is more explicit: "Were I merely asked to grant that
 the anticipations of experience involved with (more accurately than
 "in") induction cannot be accounted for except by the ancient hy-
 pothesis that man has been made in the image of his Maker, so far as
 his Reason goes, I should be compelled to admit this" (2.22). And
 again, "To believe in a god at all, is not that to believe that man's
 reason is allied to the originating principle of the universe?" (2.24)
 By "originating principle of the universe" Peirce may be saying
 no more than that man discerns the laws of nature originally established
 by God, in the sense of apprehending the laws governing natural bodies
 as these are directed, mediately or immediately, by God's will. Such
 a view might be indistinguishable from any number of familiar models
 of divine providence, ranging from deism to occasionalism. But before
 we rest content with such a conclusion, we should want to know
 what Peirce means by 'God'. Fortunately, he has no qualms about
 telling us:
 If a pragmatist is asked what he means by the word 'God,'
 he can only say that just as long acquaintance with a man
 of great character may deeply influence one's whole manner
 of conduct, . . . [and] if contemplation and study of the
 physico-psychical universe can imbue a man with principles
 of conduct analogous to the influence of a great man's works
 or conversations, then that analogue of a mind ... is what
 he means by 'God' . . . the discoveries of science, their
 enabling us to predict what will be the course of nature,
 is proof conclusive that, though we cannot think any thought
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 of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought, as it
 were. (6.502)
 This passage is striking in its suggestiveness. We have seen that he
 compares the relationship between the basic conceptions in human con-
 sciousness with the objective general features of reality, i.e., natural
 laws. Here he seems to be saying that the scientific discovery of a
 natural law is in a sense "catching a fragment of [God's] Thought."
 Is he here identifying the objective general features of reality with
 the order of the ideas in God's consciousness (or mind)? Such an
 interpretation is tempting, especially in the light of his remarks else-
 where, for example when he says that: "Analogy suggests that the
 laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast con-
 sciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively
 to us" (5.107). This would make God ontologically immanent in na-
 ture, however, to a degree to which Peirce, in the light of his various
 fairly traditional theological statements, would probably be unwil-
 ling to go. He was not a pantheist; God is not identical with nature,
 since He does not exist in time and place as finite things do ("But
 the God of my theism is not finite. That won't do at all" (8.262).) A
 more plausible reading, and one which seems more consonant with
 the wording of the above passage, would be to take God in the sense
 of a Creator whose thoughts are expressed and displayed in His work.
 Presumably God is a rational creator; man is made to God's image;
 therefore man has within him the ability to contemplate and intel-
 lectually penetrate to some degree the rational plan at work in na-
 ture, i.e., God's thoughts expressed in laws of nature. It is not that
 the laws of nature simply are God's thought; rather, it is by contem-
 plating and becoming intimately acquainted with the natural phe-
 nomena governed by laws that we catch a glimmering of God's thought.
 And far from being an optional mode of considering the universe re-
 served for the pious, Peirce thinks that some such attitude is cog-
 nitively necessary for the regulative aim of science. "Nature only
 appears intelligible as far as its processes are seen to be like processes
 of thought" (3.422; emphasis added). Nature's most intimate secrets
 are revealed only to those individual who adopt a certain quasi-reli-
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 gious attitude toward it, born of long familiarity with its processes.
 The mystic and the natural scientist on this account, are perhaps
 closer bed-fellows than it is customary to suppose. Both are making
 contact with the same Reality behind the appearances. If the first
 moment of scientific inquiry is the initial generation of explanatory
 hypotheses, then the last moment may well be the realization of the
 ultimate explanation behind the conditions necessary for successful
 hypothesis generation in the first place.
 III. Conclusion
 Our discussion has obviously taken us a long way from our rather
 humble initial recognition of two "moments" within Peirce's account
 of the abductive phase of scientific inquiry. I have tried to sketch
 what appear to be the main strategies he employs in the justification
 of this phase. At the same time, an attempt has been made to dis-
 play some of the conceptual richness of the explanations he brings to
 bear on the problem. His solution is at once naturalistic, idealistic,
 and theistic. By putting forth arguments drawn from various sci-
 entific, philosophic, and theological doctrines, he is able to present
 a comprehensive explanation of the foundations of scientific knowl-
 edge of astonishing comprehensiveness and power. It is somewhat
 doubtful, I think, that Peirce 's account is unproblematic in all of its
 details. What is certain, however, is that his account succeeds beauti-
 fully in what is perhaps a more vital function: liberating the serious
 inquirer, for a time at least, from the rather narrow confines which
 too often characterize even philosophical reflection, thus throwing
 open the gates to the exploration of more fruitful roads of inquiry.
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 NOTES
 1. C. F. Delaney, "Peirce on Simplicity* and the Conditions of the
 Possibility of Science," in History of Philosophy in the Making, J. L. Thro (ed.)
 (Washington University Press of America, 1982), p. 178.
 2. All references are to the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,
 ed. by C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. W. Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, Mass: Har-
 vard University Press, 1931-35, 1958), by volume and paragraph number.
 3. The above account follows Peirce's own summary of his doctrine
 given in: "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (6.468-6.473).
 4. For consistency the term 'retroduction' has been replaced with
 the synonymous term 'abduction' throughout this paper.
 5. See Posterior Analytics, Bk. 1, chaps. 2, 6, 19-21, and Bk. II, chap.
 19. Question: Are Peirce's notions of 'Insight' or 'Instinct* functionally similar
 to Aristotle's notion of 'Quick Wit' in Bk. II, chap. 34?
